Over the past several decades in the US Congress, there has been a decline in the fraction of bills introduced that eventually become law. This decline in legislative effectiveness has occurred in parallel with rising levels of political polarization, where coordination occurs primarily within not between groups, which are often defined by political party affiliation. However, in part due to challenges in measuring political polarization, the link between effectiveness and polarization is unclear. In this article, we have two goals. Methodologically, we propose a general method for identifying opposing coalitions in signed networks. Substantively, we use the partisanship of such coalitions in the US Congress since 1979 to examine the impact of polarization on rates of bill passage. Based on the legislative process used by the US Congress, it might be expected that a chamber's bills are more likely to become law when the controlling party holds a larger majority. However, we show that changes in bill passage rates are better explained by the partisanship of a chamber's largest coalition, which we identify by partitioning a signed network of legislators into two mutually opposing, but internally cohesive groups.
W
ithin the field of comparative US politics, two topics attract particular attention at the federal level: legislative effectiveness and political polarization. Legislative effectiveness refers to the ability of individual legislators (1, 2) , or of an entire legislative body (3) , to advance their agenda, typically by facilitating the passage of legislation. Political polarization (when applied to elected officials or "elites") refers to the formation of non-overlapping ideologically homogeneous groups (4, 5) . When these groups mirror political party affiliations, as they do in the United States (i.e. Republicans and Democrats), it is also called partisan polarization. For several decades, legislative effectiveness in the US has declined (as illustrated in Figure 1 ), while partisan polarization has increased (5) . These trends have led many to hypothesize that they are related, and specifically that "unified party control has [not] been legislatively more productive than divided party control" (6, xii). Most research on performance of political systems, and on the link between polarization and legislative effectiveness, has focused on legislators' ideological positions (7) , role of political parties (8, 9) , and majority party size (10) within legislative chambers. However, others have suggested that a focus on parties to explain the dynamics of the US Congress is misguided (11) . Therefore, in this paper, we adopt a different approach, focusing not on legislators' political party affiliations, but instead focusing on their network of positive and negative interactions with each other during a two-year session. We find that this approach -examining polarization from the perspective of networks and structural balance -offers a better explanation of legislative effectiveness than political parties.
We use signed networks for modeling legislators and their relationships because they include both positive and negative edges, which better represent the potential complexity of political alliances. Specifically, we use signed networks of legislators (12) inferred from bill-cosponsorship data for US Senate and House of Representatives between 1979 and 2016. Previous research (5) on the same data has shown an increase in polarization in the US Congress when measured by the triangle index, which provides a locally-aggregated index of balance (13) . However, the triangle index only measures the level of balance and polarization, but does not identify the members of the political coalitions that are polarized. For this we turn to the frustration index (14-16) (also known as the
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The effectiveness of legislative bodies lies in their ability to pass legislation, which has been declining in the US Congress for decades. Polarization is often identified as a possible cause, but because polarization is difficult to measure, its role remains unclear. We propose a general method for identifying opposing coalitions in signed networks, and apply it to identify the members of polarized coalitions in the US Congress. This method provides substantially more information than existing approaches that measure a signed graph's level of balance, but do not identify the coalitions themselves. We find that although polarization may have other undesirable effects, the dominance of a single polarized coalition can be a protective factor that enhances legislative effectiveness.
line index of balance (17)), which optimally partitions a signed graph into two opposing but internally cohesive "coalitions" (18) . Substantively, these coalitions (19) represent groups of legislators who are political allies, but who are political enemies with those in the other coalition. In our analyses of legislative effectiveness, we focus on the level of partisanship within the largest, and therefore controlling, coalition.
Computing the frustration index is an NP-hard problem (20) so is the equivalent partitioning problem which deals with minimizing the total number of intra-group negative and inter-group positive edges. Most studies on this topic use heuristic methods for partitioning signed networks under similar objectives (21) (22) (23) (24) . These methods are not guaranteed to provide the optimal solution or even its approximation within a constant factor (20, 25) , but can potentially be implemented on larger networks.
Computing the exact value of frustration index, in principle, involves searching among all possible ways to partition a given signed network into k ≤ 2 groups in order to find the partitioning which minimizes the total number of intra-group negative and inter-group positive edges. We propose a new method for tackling the intensive computations by providing upper and lower bounds for this number, then solving an optimization model which closes the gap between the two bounds and returns the exact value of frustration index alongside the optimal partitioning of vertices.
Signed graph preliminaries
In this section, we recall some basic definitions of signed graphs and balance theory. 
Balance and cycles. (26) . It was then formulated as a set of graph-theoretic conditions by Cartwright and Harary (27) which define a signed graph to be balanced if all its cycles are positive. Cartwright and Harary also introduce measuring the level of balance using, among other indices, the fraction of positive cycles (27, page 288) . Three years later, Harary suggested using frustration index (17) (under a different name); a measure which satisfies key axiomatic properties (16) , but has been underused for decades due to the complexity involving its computation (25, 28, 29) . In more recent studies, methods involving matrix multiplication (13) , and graph optimization (28) were introduced for measuring partial balance (16) which we discuss next.
Evaluating balance and frustration
In this section, we explain our computational approach to analyzing signed networks by providing brief definitions and discussions on measuring balance, frustration and partitioning, and graph optimization models.
Measuring partial balance. Signed networks representing real data are often unbalanced, which motivates measuring the intermediate level of partial balance (16) . The first measure we use is triangle index denoted by T (G) which equals the fraction of positive cycles of length 3 (30, 31) . We use Eq. (3) suggested in (13) for computing T (G) in which Tr(A) denotes the trace (sum of diagonal entries) of A.
The other measure we use is the normalized frustration index (16) denoted by F (G) and expressed in Eq. (4). This measure is based on the frustration index (14, 17, 32) which equals the minimum number of edges whose removal results in a balanced graph. The frustration index is denoted by L(G) in Eq. (4) and its formal definition is provided next.
We develop a new computational model based on a combination of recently developed methods (25, 28) to initially provide bounds for the frustration index and then compute it.
Figure 2 (A) shows an example signed graph in which the three dotted lines represent negative edges and the four solid lines represent positive edges. The level of balance in this signed graph can be evaluated using triangles (B) or frustration (C). The former approach, (B), involves identifying triangle 1-4-5 as unbalanced and triangle 1-3-4 as balanced leading to the numeric index T (G) = 1/2. Note that this approach disregards node 2 and the two edges incident on it as they are not part of any triangle. The latter approach, (C), involves finding a partitioning of vertices {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}} (shown by green and purple colors) which minimizes the total number of intra-group negative and inter-group positive edges to L(G) = 1 (only edge (1, 5) according to this partitioning) leading to the numeric index F (G) = 5/7. Note that removing edge (1, 5) leads to a balanced signed graph.
Frustration and partitioning. Given signed graph G = (V, E, σ), we can partition V into two subsets: X and V \ X. We let binary variable xi denote the subset which node i belongs to under partitioning {X, V \ X}, where xi = 1 if i ∈ X and xi = 0 otherwise.
A positive edge (i, j) ∈ E
+ is said to be frustrated if its endpoints i and j belong to different subsets (xi = xj). A negative edge (i, j) ∈ E − is said to be frustrated if its endpoints i and j belong to the same subset (xi = xj). We define the frustration count fG(X) as the number of frustrated edges of G under partitioning {X, V \ X}:
where fij(X) is the frustration state of edge (i, j), given by
The frustration index L(G) of a graph G can be computed exactly by finding partitioning X * , V \ X * ⊆ V of G that minimizes the frustration count fG(X), i.e., solving Eq. (6) (25, 28) .
Recent studies on frustration index and signed networks suggest (25, 28) and implement (29) efficient graph optimization models to compute the frustration index of relatively large (up to 10 5 edges) sparse networks. However, the signed networks of legislators we analyze have substantially higher densities compared to the instances considered in (25, 28, 29) . This requires developing a new computational model for tackling the intensive computations required for obtaining the frustration index of dense graphs.
Bounding the frustration index. In this subsection, we discuss obtaining lower and upper bounds for the frustration index. Using these bounds is a way of substantially reducing the running time, but theoretically they are not required.
The linear programming relaxation (LP relaxation) of the binary optimization models in (25, 28) can be used to compute a lower bound for the frustration index. The linear programming model in Eq. (7) is developed for this purpose and has continuous decision variables within the unit interval.
In Eq. (7) 
The optimal solution Y * to the model in Eq. (7) is a lower bound for the frustration index Y * ≤ L(G). Any given partitioning {X, V \ X} for signed graph G is associated with a frustration count fG(X) which is by definition (as in Eq. (6)) an upper bound for the frustration index
We use a specific partitioning {X , V \ X } as a starting point to "warm-start" the algorithm for computing the frustration index. Regardless of which starting point, the algorithm arrives at the same globally optimal solution. Partitioning {X , V \ X } is essentially grouping nodes into two subsets based on the party affiliation of legislators. To be more precise, for node i which represents a legislator, decision variable xi is given initial value 0 if the reciprocal legislator is a Democrat and xi is given initial value 1 otherwise.
Computing the frustration index. After bounding the frustration index, we use the binary linear programming model in Eq. (8) which minimizes the number of frustrated edges. The binary variables of the model are fij ∀(i, j) ∈ E which denotes frustration of edge (i, j) and xi∀i ∈ V which denotes the subset of node i. To warm-start the algorithm which solves Eq. (8), we initialize xi variables based on partitioning {X , V \ X }. The model in Eq. (8) 7).
We implement a speed-up technique known as prioritized branching (25) 
Results
In this section, we provide the results of analyzing balance and frustration in signed networks of US Congress legislators.
Polarization and partial balance. We evaluate the level of partial balance using two different methods. Computational results on frustration. Solving the continuous optimization model in Eq. (7) and the discrete (binary) optimization model in Eq. (8) requires intensive computations for large instances such as signed networks of the House. Given the size and density of these instances, the models in Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) have thousands of variables and thousands or even millions of constraints requiring a high performance computer taking advantage of parallel computing capabilities (29) . For example, the signed graph instance of 113th House session has m = 75, 771 edges and |T | = 7, 102, 625 triangles which result in a total of m+4|T | = 28, 486, 271 constraints for the model in Eq. (7). Gurobi solver takes 5300 seconds (around 1.5 hours) to solve the model in Eq. (7) to global optimality and return Y * , the lower bound for the frustration index. For the same instance, the discrete optimization model in Eq. (8) has n + m = 76, 218 binary variables and 2m + 1 = 151, 543 constraints. This large instance takes 43, 523 seconds (around 12 hours) for Gurobi to reach global optimality and return the frustration index and the partitioning of the nodes. In total for the 113th session of the House, it takes 48, 823 seconds (around 13.5 hours) to compute the exact value of the frustration index which is the longest solve time among all instances. The average solve time of House instances is 17, 763 seconds (around 5 hours) and the standard deviation is 15, 411 seconds (around 4.5 hours). For Senate instances, the average computation time is 4 seconds and the standard deviation is 6 seconds.
Partitioning and largest coalition. Using the optimal values of the xi variables obtained by solving the optimization models in Eq. (7) and Eq. (8), we partition nodes of each network into two groups (subsets X * , V \ X * ). For each signed network, either X * or V \ X * has the larger set cardinality and therefore represents the largest coalition for the corresponding session. Figure 4 shows the size of the largest and therefore controlling coalitions (winning coalitions (19) ) in each signed network alongside the number of Democrats and Republicans in each session for both chambers. Interestingly, the controlling coalitions that our partitioning algorithm produces are consistent with Riker's theory of minimum winning coalitions (19) which argues that politicians try to form winning (larger than majority limit) coalitions which are cohesive and minimal in size.
For each session and chamber, we evaluate the composition of the controlling coalitions based on the party affiliation of its legislators. Figure 5 illustrates the number of legislators from each of the two main political parties in the controlling coalitions of the US Congress. As it can be seen in Figure 5 , the controlling coalitions have become more homogeneous (i.e. partisan) over time during the time period 1979-2016. To investigate possible explanations, we estimate two separate structural equation models for each chamber. A commonsense model tests the expectation that when the majority party holds a larger numerical majority, they should have greater success passing bills (10) . The key variable in this model, * We report standardized coefficients (β) for all models to facilitate cross-model comparisons. The percentage point changes are unstandardized bivariate regression coefficients, reported here for context. party control, is defined as the absolute difference between the number of Republican-and Democratic-affiliated legislators. Its computation does not require any information about the legislators' network. We find no support for this model; party control does not mediate the relationship between time and passage rate. (see Figure 6 B ).
Session
Passage Rate A more nuanced model tests the expectation that when the controlling coalition is more partisan and thus more ideologically unified, it will have greater success passing bills. The key variable in this mode, coalition control, is defined as the fraction of non-independent members in the largest coalition that affiliate with that coalition's dominant political party (see Figure 5) . Clearly, this variable requires knowledge of the legislators' network and a method to partition that network into internally cohesive opposing coalitions. We find support for this model in the US House, but not the US Senate (see Figure 6 ). Specifically, we find that in the House, the partisan homogeneity of the controlling coalition has increased over time (β = 0.771, p < .01), which is consistent with past findings concerning polarization (5) , and that coalition homogeneity increases passage rates (β = 0.661, p < 0.05), which is consistent with our expectation about the impact of ideological unity. Together, these effects imply a significant and positive indirect effect of time on the passage rate (β = 0.510, p < .05), mediated by coalition control. Thus, the observed decline in bill passage rates in the US House would have been worse (direct effect: β = −1.038, p < .01), but was mitigated by increasingly ideologically homogeneous coalitions, which are a protective factor against declines in legislative effectiveness.
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Summary and Conclusions
In this study we proposed a general method for identifying internally cohesive opposing coalitions in signed networks of legislators based on structural balance theory, then applied this method to identify opposing coalitions in the US Congress, showing that these coalitions' partisanship can explain changes in legislative effectiveness better than political parties. Based on this analysis, we offer a series of substantive and methodological conclusions.
Consistent with prior studies (4, 5) , we find that polarization has increased in both the US Senate and US House of Representatives, and that this polarization has largely mirrored partisan divisions along political party lines. We operationalized polarization using the level of a signed graph's structural balance, and therefore measure what (5) calls "strong polarization," but have used two different measures of balance. The triangle index, T (G), is the fraction of triangles that are balanced, while the normalized frustration index, F (G), is based on the minimum number of edges that must be removed to achieve total balance. We find that they are highly correlated and both support the conclusion of increasing polarization.
The triangle index is easy to compute, but provides only a locally-aggregated measure of a graph's level of balance. In contrast, computing the frustration index is difficult, but it provides not only a global measure of a graph's level of balance, but also the optimal partitioning of vertices into internally cohesive but mutually antagonist groups. We have demonstrated a practical method for computing the exact value of frustration index and identifying the optimal partition in dense graphs of |E| 50000 that involves first obtaining upper and lower bounds, using exogenous node properties (e.g. legislators' political party affiliations) to provide a starting partition, and solving a large-scale binary linear programming model. In the context of signed legislative networks, this method allows us to identify the most cohesive coalitions of legislators under conditions of political polarization.
Although our computational innovations make the identification of internally cohesive opposing coalitions practically feasible, we must also demonstrate that these coalitions are more informative than other simpler grouping possibilities. In the legislative context, we show that the partisan composition of these optimally balanced coalitions better explain legislative effectiveness in the US House of Representatives than simply examining legislators' political party affiliations. This affirms Mayhew's claim that "no theoretical treatment of the United States Congress that posits parties as analytic units will go very far" (11, p.27) but goes a step further by identifying an alternative analytic unit -internally cohesive opposing coalitions -that does have explanatory power. Importantly, coalitions' appear useful only for explaining the legislative effectiveness of the House of Representatives, but not the Senate. However, this is also consistent with existing political science theory that "the lack of majority control of [procedural] processes in the Senate negates the possibility of significant party [or other group-based] effects in that body" (37, p.7). Therefore, in general terms, our empirical findings suggest that in legislative bodies where a sufficiently large group of legislators can influence procedure, the composition of the largest coalition is more important than the size of the majority party's majority. This is perhaps obvious in parliamentary systems where multi-party coalition forming is essential, but is noteworthy in the non-parliamentary US Congress.
These conclusions have some significant implications for both the future study of signed networks, and of the link between polarization and legislative effectiveness. First, by providing a practical method for computing the frustration index of relatively dense graphs, we hope to move the study of signed graphs beyond merely determining the level of balance, and toward the study of how the composition of two mostly opposing groups impact other network dynamics. Second, our empirical findings suggest that research on polarization and its impact on the legislative process should look beyond political parties and partisanship to more subtle but influential forms of coordination, such as internally cohesive coalitions which are antagonist towards one another.
Materials and Methods
Relations of collaboration and opposition between elected officials are difficult to collect directly because politicians have limited time to participate in surveys and have good reasons to conceal their true political relations. Therefore, studies of elected officials' political networks typically measure these relations indirectly, using bipartite projections focusing on their co-sponsorship of bills (38) , co-voting on bills (36, 39, 40) , co-membership on committees (41), and co-attendance at press events (42). For a range of substantive reasons noted by (5) (e.g. relatively few bills are actually voted on, committee memberships are driven by such non-ideological factor such as seniority), we examine political relations from bill cosponsorship. Specifically, we examine a signed network of inferred positive and negative political relations among the members of the US House of Representatives, and among the members of the US Senate, in each session of Congress from 1979 to 2016 (96th session -114th session). Although data on earlier sessions are available, we exclude them because prior to the 96th session, House rules imposed a limit of 25 co-sponsors per bill, which artificially distorts co-sponsorship patterns and limits the usefulness of these data for inferring political networks (43) .
In each signed network, a pair of legislators have a positive relation (e.g. of collaboration) if they co-sponsored many of the same bills, and have a negative relation (e.g. of opposition) if they co-sponsored few of the same bills. A stochastic degree sequence model (SDSM) (12) is used to define thresholds of "many" and "few." The SDSM builds the empirical sampling distribution of two legislators' joint co-sponsorships under a null model in which each legislator co-sponsored approximately the same number of bills and each bill received approximately the same number of co-sponsorships (i.e. holding approximately constant the legislator and bill degree sequence). Decisions about whether a given dyad has a positive or negative relation are made by comparing their observed number of joint co-sponsorships to the empirical sampling distribution; here a two-tailed α = 0.05 threshold is used. These signed networks are described in detail by (5) and are available in a public Figshare data repository (44) .
The 19 signed networks for the US Senate have slightly over 100 nodes, each representing a senator, and total edge count between 2073-3932, which results in density values between 0.41 and 0.78. The proportions of negative edges are within the range of 0.61 and 0.82. The 19 signed networks for the US House of Representatives have slightly over 435 nodes, each representing a representative, and a total edge count between 48721 and 77872, which results in densities in the range of 0.50-0.77. The proportion of negative edges varies between 0.64 and 0.84. The networks are slightly larger than the number of legislative seats in their respective chambers because a single seat may be occupied by more than one legislator during a single session, for example due to a death, retirement, or resignation. Accordingly, the nodes in these networks represent individual legislators, not legislative seats. Although these data represent a time-series of legislative interactions, we examine the networks cross-sectionally for two reasons. First, there are a large number of joiners and leavers in each new session as incumbents lose their seats, freshmen join Congress, or representatives become senators, making most dynamic models impractical to estimate. Second, although some political relationships develop over long periods of time, the effectiveness of any particular session of Congress is independent.
